HERE<\/span><\/a><\/p>\nTechnology <\/span>XLK<\/b> led the way while income-and-value-oriented utilities\u2019 <\/span>XLU <\/b>edged finance\u2019s <\/span>XLF <\/b>for the worst in the list, down almost 2%.\u00a0 Year-to-date, energy and technology continue to be the only above-average performers.\u00a0 Next-in-line YTD are Materials, despite a poor year for gold (<\/span>GLDM<\/b>).\u00a0 Our ratings reflect the trend. <\/span>XLE <\/b>\u00a0and <\/span>XLK<\/b> are the only sectors rated above-average with ValuEngine ratings of <\/span>4 <\/b>(Buy) and <\/span>5 <\/b>(Strong Buy) respectively.\u00a0 The worst all year has been <\/span>XLY<\/b>, the Consumer Discretionary Select Sector SPDR,<\/span> indicating lackluster demand for non-necessary purchases. Clearly, consumers remain very bearish on the US economy.\u00a0 Both consumer sectors are rated by ValuEngine as <\/span>1 <\/b>(Strong Sell).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\nThe top 3 US-domiciled stocks over $10 billion in market cap that rose the most this month-to-date:<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n| Ticker<\/b><\/td>\n | Company Name<\/b><\/td>\n | VE Rating<\/b><\/td>\n | Month-to-Date (MTD)<\/b><\/td>\n | Year-to-Date (YTD)<\/b><\/td>\n | Last Week Performance<\/b><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n| SNDK<\/b><\/td>\n | SanDisk Corporation<\/span><\/td>\n | 5<\/b><\/td>\n | 16.42%<\/b><\/td>\n | 551.01%<\/span><\/td>\n | 3.85%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n| TWST<\/b><\/td>\n | Twist Bioscience Corporation<\/span><\/td>\n | 5<\/b><\/td>\n | 11.89%<\/b><\/td>\n | 415.56%<\/span><\/td>\n | 4.12%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n| MRNA<\/b><\/td>\n | Moderna, Inc.<\/span><\/td>\n | 5<\/b><\/td>\n | 9.54%<\/b><\/td>\n | 399.16%<\/span><\/td>\n | 2.98%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n Returning to the equity duration issue, the historical comparisons to the dot-com bubble has been brought up by many strategists for a few years now as the \u201ctoo-overvalued\u201d market kept getting higher and making investors even more billions.\u00a0 At some point, the bubble has to burst, right?\u00a0 Actually, we do not know.\u00a0 History says the eventual catalyst will not be overvaluation itself.\u00a0 Rather, once some major structural event threatens investments or some major company\u2019s collapse (e.g. Enron) will shake faith in the system. Then overvaluation will play a key role in accelerating at least a temporary selling frenzy.<\/span><\/p>\nLet\u2019s take a look at the similarities and major differences with the correction sparked by the bursting of the tech bubble.\u00a0 \u00a0 The structural cash-flow horizons and valuation baselines highlight the similarities between the two market eras :<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n| Metric or Attribute<\/b><\/td>\n | The Dot-Com Peak (1999\u20132000)<\/b><\/td>\n | Trump Administration Expansion Cycle (Jan 2025\u2013Sept 2026)<\/b><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n| SPY Price Shift<\/b><\/td>\n | Strong Upward Trend (1999 Price Return: +19.53%)<\/span><\/td>\n | Major Bull Run (+29.47%, from $589.01 to $762.60)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n| S&P 500 Dividend Yield<\/b><\/td>\n | Troughed at a historical low of 1.09%<\/span><\/td>\n | Compressed from 1.25% down to 1.00%<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n| Shiller CAPE Multiple<\/b><\/td>\n | Peak ratio reached 44.19x<\/span><\/td>\n | Expanded from 37.14x to 41.09x<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n| Beginning Implied Duration<\/b><\/td>\n | ~24.5 Years (Late 1998)<\/span><\/td>\n | 23.4 Years (January 1, 2025)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n| Ending\/Peak Implied Duration<\/b><\/td>\n | ~28.2 Years (March 2000 Peak)<\/span><\/td>\n | 26.6 Years (September 17, 2026)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n| Total Duration Extension<\/b><\/td>\n | +3.7 Years (in 14 months)<\/span><\/td>\n | +3.2 Years<\/b> (in 21 months)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n Another similarity has to do with the spike in borrowers\u2019 interest rates. During the Dot-Com peak, a high equity duration left stocks vulnerable to interest rate hikes. In the current cycle, equity duration has added more than three full years of systemic interest rate sensitivity during a period when long-bond yields expanded to multi-decade highs. This behavior demonstrates a historic decoupling where equity duration expanded via localized corporate tech premia, while traditional fixed-income portfolios contracted under the weight of stubborn inflation and heavy fiscal debt issuance.<\/span><\/p>\nFree Trial: Direct Access to ValuEngine Research on over 5,000 stocks and 700 ETFs\u00a0<\/span>HERE<\/span><\/a><\/p>\nDespite these very similar risk data, there are also key differences between the periods, especially the metrics used to fuel the market\u2019s exuberance.\u00a0 The dot-com bubble was fueled by a belief that the expansion of eyeballs viewing a website would lead to future sales and earnings.\u00a0 This bull run has been fueled, at least partially, by real earnings reports and earnings growth.\u00a0 That\u2019s a huge difference in substance vs. hype.\u00a0 However,\u00a0 analysts also have very enthusiastic future expectations that today\u2019s technology leaders will continue to dominate the AI and technology spaces for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile another major factor that has also had exponential growth is market-cap weighted indexing benefiting the highest weighted stocks most.\u00a0 The following estimated metrics are from the University of Pennsylvania\u2019s White Center for Financial Research.<\/span><\/p>\nMetric <\/b> End of 2000<\/b><\/p>\n S&P 500 Passively Indexed AUM<\/span>\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0~$1.0 trillion ($870B non-enhanced + $63B enhanced)<\/span><\/p>\nTotal U.S. Stock Market Capitalization<\/span>\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0~$17.03 trillion<\/span><\/p>\nS&P 500 Index Funds as % of Market<\/span>\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 ~5.87%<\/span>\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Compared to 2025: ~22.07%<\/strong><\/p>\nGetting back to the inclusion of Goldman Sachs\u2019 Innovators <\/span>BSEP<\/b>, an 8% buffer ETF.\u00a0 The current economic and potential market bubble anxieties have increased investor demand for downside protection.\u00a0 As has happened often in the past, this demand had been anticipated by a then-startup called Innovator Capital Management.\u00a0 They introduced the first buffered ETFs toward the end of 2018 with newly garnered SEC approval.\u00a0 In the beginning, as with most new concepts, most investors had no idea why they would pay a nearly 1% fee to shield themselves from a market that went up most of time.\u00a0 Such times have changed.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\nAlso known as defined-outcome ETFs, these structured vehicles allow investors to participate in the upside of an underlying index (like the S&P 500 or Nasdaq-100) up to a predetermined maximum return cap, while providing built-in downside protection. A typical fund might shield an investor against the first 10% to 15% of market losses over an annual period, resetting its caps and hedges every year. This structural buffer allows investors to stay exposed to equity premiums while stripping out localized downside volatility.\u00a0 The defined-outcome category has exploded since Innovator Capital Management pioneered the very first buffer ETFs. The sector’s momentum reached a fever pitch in April 2026, when Wall Street giant Goldman Sachs officially acquired Innovator, absorbing its $31 billion in assets and bringing the broader defined-outcome market size closer to an estimated $80 billion globally.<\/span><\/p>\nHere is the historical listing and asset data tracking the expansion of the buffered (defined-outcome) ETF category on U.S. exchanges:<\/span><\/p>\nFree Trial: Direct Access to ValuEngine Research on over 5,000 stocks and 700 ETFs\u00a0<\/span>HERE<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n| The Growth of Buffered ETFs in the U.S.<\/b><\/td>\n | September 1, 2021<\/b><\/td>\n | December 29, 2025 (Close)<\/b><\/td>\n | September 2026 (Current)<\/b><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n| Total Number of Listed Funds<\/b><\/td>\n | 141<\/span><\/td>\n | 420<\/span><\/td>\n | 539<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n| Collective Assets Under Management (AUM)<\/b><\/td>\n | $9.2 Billion<\/span><\/td>\n | $78.0 Billion<\/span><\/td>\n | $99.06 Billion<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n | | | | | | | | | | | | | |